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RIGHT OF AN EMPLOYER TO DISCHARGE AN
EMPLOYEE FOR REFUSAL TO TESTIFY BEFORE A
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON THE GROUND OF
SELF-INCRIMINATION
The ever increasing tendency of witnesses called before Congressional investigating committees to invoke the Fifth Amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination in order to avoid answering
questions as to Communist party membership or activity has posed
numerous problems. Not the least of these is the problem facing both
government and private employers. Is a refusal by an official or
employee to testify as to Communist party membership or activity
because of the privilege against self-incrimination a sufficient ground
to warrant his discharge?
It is the aim of this article to examine briefly the nature of the
privilege against self-incrimination, the propriety of invoking the
privilege before a Congressional investigating committee to avoid
answering questions as to Communist party membership or activity,
the inference to be drawn from such invocation, and more particularly,
whether an employer may properly discharge an employee or an official
for such invocation or refusal to testify.
NATURE OF THE PRIVILEGE

While considerable controversy has raged over the applicability of
the privilege against self-incrimination, it has never been seriously
doubted that the privilege does exist. The Fifth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution provides:
". .. no person . . .shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself."'
It is well settled that the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth
Amendment is not made applicable by the Fourteenth Amendment2 as a
protection against state action, for the freedom from "testimonial
compulsion" is neither a right of national citizenship nor a privilege
or immunity secured by the Bill of Rights. 3 However, the privilege has
been made available to witnesses in state proceedings by provisions in
the majority of state constitutions. 4 The remaining states recognize
the privilege as part of their common law.5

'U.S.

CONST. AMEND. V.

2 U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV.
3

Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937) ; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
446 states have incorporated the privilege in their constitutions. For case illustration see cases cited in 8 WGMORE, EVIDENCE 2252 n.3 (3rd ed. 1940).
5 Iowa and New Jersey: See State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902);
State v. Miller, 71 N.J.L. 527, 60 A. 202 (1905) ; State v. Zdanowicz, 69 N.J.L.

619, 55 A. 743 (1905).
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Originally developed in order to put an end to the practice of
extorting incriminating statements from accused persons, the privilege
finds further justification because it stimulates the police and prosecutors to search for the most dependable evidence procurable." Without
the privilege there would be a tendency to rely upon less dependable
coerced admissions that might be the result of compulsory interrogation.
Though in general conflict with the principle that in criminal cases
the government (in private litigation the parties thereto) is entitled
to the testimony of every competent person who may have knowledge
of the material facts pertinent to the litigation,7 the privilege is sustained
because:
"... the immediate and practical evils of self-disclosure transcend
any difficulties that the exercise of the privilege may impose on
society in the detection and prosecution of crime."
In availing oneself of the privilege, the individual claiming it must
do so personallyY However, the mere fact that he asserts that the
answer may incriminate him is not, in and of itself, sufficient to excuse
him from answering. It is for the court to decide whether his fear is
well grounded. As the Supreme Court pointed out in the Rogers"1 case:
cc... Since the privilege against self-incrimination pre-supposes

a real danger of legal detriment arising from the disclosure,
petitioner cannot invoke the privilege where a response to the
specific question in issue would not further incriminate him...
as to each question to which a claim of privilege is directed,
the court must determine whether the answer to that particular
question would subject the witness to a real danger of further
incrimination."
If the court decides that the question would not incriminate, the witness
can not refuse to answer. It is not proper to refuse to answer, "for a

2
purely fanciful protection . . . against an imaginary danger."'

While the court can require a witness to respond if it clearly
appears that the witness is mistaken in his right to refuse to answer,"3
a witness cannot be forced to disclose the basis of his refusal nor in any
way be compelled to justify his use of the privilege.' 4 Nor is it essential
that the answer sought be in and of itself an admission of guilt 'before
6 Pitman, The Colonial and ConstitutionalHistory of the Privilege Against Self

Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763 (1935) ; 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,
ed. 1940).
Burr, Fed. Cas. No. 14692 E (1807).
United States v. White, 332 U.S. 624 (1944).
9United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943).
10Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362 (1917); Hoffman v. United States,
341 U.S. 479 (1951).
"1 Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
12 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
13Hoffman v. United States, supra, note 10.
24Supra, note 11.
7 §2251, 2263 (3rd
United States v.
8
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one is entitled to invoke the privilege. The Supreme Court has held that
the privilege is subject to "a very liberal construction"' 5 and has
sustained its use even where the information sought would merely lead
the authorities to incriminating evidence. As pointed out in Hoffman v.
United States, the privilege
".. . applies not only to answers which would support a con-

viction under a criminal statute of the United States, but also
to answers which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence
needed to prosecute a witness for a federal crime ...to sustain
the privilege, it need only be evident from the implication of the
question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive
answer to the question or an explanation as to why it cannot
be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure
could result. The trial judge in appraising the claim must be
governed as much by his personal perception of the
6 peculiarities
of the case as by the facts actually in evidence."'
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND QUESTIONS DEALING WITH
COMMUNISM

Although the Fifth Amendment literally extends the protection
against compulsory self-incrimination only to witnesses in criminal
cases, the privilege as judicially interpreted is equally applicable to all
manner of proceedings where testimony is compelled by legal sanction.
As the Supreme Court has pointed out:
"It is impossible that the meaning of the constitutional provision
can only be that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness
against himself in a criminal prosecution against himself. It
would doubtless cover such cases but it is not limited to them.
The object was to insure that a person should not be compelled
when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony
which might tend to show that he himself had committed a crime.
The privilege is limited to criminal matters but it is as broad as
the mischief against which it seeks to guard."' 7
Thus the courts have held that the privilege may be asserted in
criminal or civil proceedings,' before a court,' 9 grand jury,20 administrative agency, 2 ' or legislative body. While no cases have reached the

Supreme Court challenging the applicability of the privilege to hearings
before either House of Congress or a Congressional committee, the
lower courts have sustained the use of the privilege by witnesses called
15 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).

16Hoffman v. United States, supra, note 10.
17Supra, note 15.
18 McCarthy v. Arndtstein, 226 U.S. 34 (1924) ; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1896).
19Supra, note 15.
20 (Patricia)
Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950); Hale v. Henkle,
201 U.S. 43 (1906).
21 Supra, note 12; Estes v. Potter, 183 F.2d 865 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 920
(1951).
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in Congressional investigations. 22 State courts, construing similar
provisions in state constitutions, have held the privilege to be applicable
23
to hearings before legislative committees.
While it is well established that 'being a Communist is not in and
of itself a crime,2 ' the question remains whether answering questions
as to membership or activity in the Communist party would so "tend to
incriminate" as to present a proper occasion to warrant invocation of
the privilege. Several relatively recent cases25 appear to justify refusal
to testify before a grand jury as to Communist affiliation on the ground
that an admission "of intimate knowledge of or close connection with
the Communist party may tend to incriminate a witness under that
part of the Smith Act which makes it a violation of Federal law to
28
advocate a forceful overthrow of the government."
The Blau case2 7 arose out of a series of contempt prosecutions
initiated by the Federal government upon the refusal of several
witnesses to testify before a Federal grand jury as to Communist party
membership and activities. At the time the case arose, twelve national
leaders of the Communist party were being prosecuted and were
subsequently convicted under the Smith Act for conspiracy to overthrow the United States government.2 Referring to their prosecution,
Patricia Blau refused to testify because her answers would associate
her with the leaders of the Communist party and thereby tend to
incriminate her under the same act. In reversing a lower court's
conviction for contempt, the-Supreme Court, referring to the Smith
Act,2 9 said:
"These provisions made .future prosecution of petitioner far
more 'than a mere imaginary possibility' ... she reasonably could
fear that criminal charges might be brought against her if she
admitted employment by the Communist party or intimate
knowledge of its workings. Whether such admissions by them22 United

States v. Yukio Abe, 95 F.Supp. 991 (1950); United States v. Emspak
95 F.Supp. 1012 (1951). Lower Federal courts had earlier affirmed the right
of Congress to inquire into political .beliefs and suspected subversive activity.
See Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49 (1949); Trumbo v. United States
176 F.2d 49 (1949).
23 Henry Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172 (1871); In re Hearing Before Joint
Legislative Committee, 187 S.C. 1, 196 S.E. 164 (1938); Dale v. Hofstader,
237 N.Y. 244, 177 N.E. 489 (1931); Commonwealth v. Prince, 313 Mass. 223,
46 N.E2d 755 (1943), aft'd, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); State v. King, 342 Mo. 107,
119 S.W.2d 322 (1938); Matter of Doyle, 257 N.Y. 244, 177 N.E. 489 (1931).
24Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943); Dunne
v. United States,
138 F2d 137 (1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 790 (1943), rehearing denied,
320 U.S. 814 (1943).
25 (Patricia) Blau v. United States, supra, note 20; (Irving) Blau v. United
States, supra, note 11.
2619 A.L.R.2d 391 (1951).
27 (Patricia) Blau v. United States, supra, note 20.
28
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
2962 STAT. 808, 18 U.S.C.A. 2385.
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selves would support a conviction under a criminal statute is
immaterial." 30
31
The court, noting its reasoning in (Patricia) Blau v. United States,
likewise reversed a contempt conviction of Patricia's husband, who was
convicted for refusing to answer questions before a Federal grand jury
concerning the activities and records of the Communist party of
Colorado. 32 The Rogers case, 33 although affirming a contempt con-

viction because the witness had waived the privilege against selfincrimination, reaffirmed the reasoning presented in the Blau cases.
Though the above mentioned cases sustained the invocation of the
privilege because the witnesses possessed intimate knowledge of the
workings of the Communist party, it is believed that the privilege could
be justifiably invoked even as to questions dealing with mere membership in the Communist party. The facts that witnesses called before
Congressional committees have availed themselves of the privilege when
asked as to membership in the Communist party and that no contempt
prosecutions have been initiated against them, would seem to bear out
this contention.
DRAWN FROM INVOCATION OF THE PRIVILEGE
Once it is established that it is proper to invoke the privilege against
self-incrimination in refusing to answer questions before Congressional
investigating committees as to present or past membership in the
Communist party, the question arises: what inference, if any, can be
drawn from an invocation of the privilege? Here, two things must
be distinguished: the nature of the privilege itself, and the policy
behind its adoption.
It is well established by the courts and text writers that there is
nothing in the nature of the privilege itself which prevents the inference
that the witness invoking the privilege is guilty of the particular matter
in question. 34 Rather, it is admitted that "the inference, as a mere
matter of logic is not only possible, but is inherent and cannot be
denied. ' 35 The truth of this is apparent from the very method of
claiming the privilege. It is available to a witness when the question
asked is such as would, if answered, incriminate or tend to incriminate
by leading to information of the witness' participation in a crime. If
the witness is honest with himself and the court in claiming the privilege, the only possible conclusion is that he is, or believes himself to be,
INFERENCE TO BE

30 (Patricia) Blau v. United. States, supra, note 20.

31 Ibid.
32 (Irving) Blau v. United States, supra, note 25.
3
3 Supra, note 11.
34
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1946); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §2251,
2263 (3rd ed. 1940) and case cited therein.
3 8 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE, §2272 (3rd ed. 1940).

1954-55]

COMMENTS

guilty of the particular crime or activity as to which he is being
questioned.
In view of the policy considerations behind the adoption of the
privilege, the general rule has been that this inference of guilt should
not be used in convicting the person claiming the privilege. To this
end-recognizing that there is nothing in the nature of the privilege
itself to prevent the inference-several legislatures have provided that
no comment upon the use of the privilege, or a complete refusal to
testify, is to be made by the judge or opposite counsel. 36 Nor is the
37
jury to give any weight to the inference in deciding the case.
8
However, several states, notably California, again recognizing
that there are no restrictions inherent in the privilege itself, allow the
judge as well as opposing counsel to comment upon the accused's failure
to testify. Moreover, such comment, as well as the inference itself, may
be considered by the jury in determining the guilt of the person refusing
to testify by invoking the privilege. The Supreme Court, in approving
a conviction under a California statute allowing such comment, said:
"However sound may be the legislative conclusion that an
accused should not be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, we see no reason why comment should
not be made upon his silence. It seems natural that when a
defendant has opportunity to deny or explain facts and determines not to do so, the prosecution should bring out the strength
of the evidence by commenting upon the defendant's failure to
explain or deny it. The prosecution's evidence may be of facts
that may be beyond the knowledge of the accused. If so, his
failure to testify would have little, if any, weight. But the facts
may be such as are necessarily in the knowledge of the accused.
In that case
a failure to explain would point to an inability to
39
explain."
In addition to the distinction between the privilege itself and the
policy considerations forbidding comment upon its invocation, one
additional factor should be noted. Assuming that the rule were universal that no inference or comment upon the invocation of the privilege
against self-incrimination could be made, the rule is applicable only to
the courts and those seeking to convict the witness of a criminal charge.
It has no effect upon the action taken by individuals or governmental
agencies other than when they endeavor to use the inference to convict
the person invoking the privilege of a crime. As the Supreme Court
pointed out at a very early date:
"The design of the constitutional privilege is not to aid the
36 Ibid., at note 2, 3.
37
Ibid.
38
Adamson v. California, supra, note 34.
9 Ibid.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

witness in vindicating his character, but to protect him against
being compelled to furnish evidence of a criminal charge. If he
secures legal immunity from prosecution, the possible impairhe
ment of his good name is a penalty which it is reasonable
40
should be compelled to pay for the common good."
Therefore, even though questions as to membership or activity in
the Communist party would so tend to incriminate a witness as to allow
him to refuse to testify before a Congressional committee, it would seem
that the inference of his membership or activity in the Communist
party, not only could, but will realistically be made. Moreover, a
governmental or private employer, since he is not seeking to convict the
witness of a criminal charge, could freely avail himself of such inference in determining the existence of sufficient ground for discharge.
DISCHARGE OF GOVERNMENTAL

PERSONNEL

The only provision for the removal of governmental officers made
by the constitution refers to the power of impeachment of "civil officers
of the United States.""1 Therefore, the propriety of removing a Federal
officer or employee from his position must depend upon the manner in
which he was appointed or chosen for the position, the authority the
appointing officer maintains over him and the duty owed by the particular official or employee.
Except the President and the Vice-President, all persons in the
civil service of the Federal government fall into one of three categories:
those appointed by the President "with the advice and consent of the
Senate" ;42 inferior officers whose appointment Congress has vested by
law "in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of the
4
departments" ;43 and employees.'
OFFICIALS APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT WITH THE ADVICE

AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE

The Constitutional history of the United States is marked by
considerable difference of opinion as to the nature and limits of the
President's power to remove officers appointed -by him "with the advice
45
and consent of the Senate."'
It was first believed that while generally the removal power was
inherent in the power to appoint, the approval of the Senate was necessary for the discharge of any officer appointed by the president "with
the advice and consent of the Senate."'64 In Ex parte Hennen, decided
4oSupra, note 12.
41 U.S. CoNsT. Art. I, §3.
42 U.S. CONST. Art. II, §2.
43 Ibid.
44 CORWIN, THE CONSTITUtON OF THE UNITED STATES, 452 (1953).

45Supra, note 42.
46 See THE FEDERALIST, No. 77 (Hamilton); KENT
COMMENTARIES, 1539,

1544.

COM IENTARIES,

310; 2

STORY,
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in 1839, the Court was of the opinion that where Congress had not
provided a set term of office for the official, he could be discharged in
the discretion of the President. The Court based its decision upon the
fact that it had become
"... a settled and well understood construction of the Constitution that the power of removal was vested in the -President alone,
of the officer was by
in such cases, although the appointment
47
the President and the Senate."
However, the removal power was believed to be subject to certain
Constitutional and statutory provisions. Under the Constitution, the
judges of the Federal courts hold office "during good behavior" and
cannot be discharged by the discretionary act of the President. Though
the issue was not raised in the Hennen case, the Court was of the
opinion that Congress could limit the President's removal power by
providing express terms of office and requiring proof of certain specified grounds before an official could be discharged.
Though the Hennen case left many questions undecided, the
Supreme Court, until its decision in the Meyer case 48 in 1928, "contrived
to side-step every occasion for a definite pronouncement regarding the
removal power, its extent and location." 49 Condemning, in the Meyer
case, an attempt by Congress to limit the removal power, the Court
held that it is not within the power of Congress to deny or limit the
President's right of removal by requiring the advice and consent of the
Senate, even though the officers were appointed by him in that manner.
It pointed out that the Constitution endows the President with unlimited
power to remove all officers in whose appointment he has participated,
with the exception of judges of the United States.50
The reasoning behind the President's power of removal is twofold.
First, the President as head of the Executive department, is required by
the Constitution "to take care that the laws are fully executed" ;51 as a
matter of political and administrative efficiency, the duty imposed upon
the President could not be effectively carried out without the right to
appoint capable, trustworthy individuals or to remove them from office
at his discretion. Second, while the legislative powers given to Congress
are specifically enumerated-and its implied powers limited to the
making of laws which are necessary and proper for carrying into
execution powers therein given and other powers vested in the government or in any of its departments-the executive power is granted to
the President in general terms without qualification or enumeration of
47 Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. (U.S.) 230 (1839).
48 Meyer v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
THE PRESIDENT-OFICE AND POWERS 162 (1948).
49 CoRiWv,
5oSupra, note 48.
51 U.S. CoNsT. Art II, §3.
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specific powers. Since the executive power includes as one of its essentials the power to remove executive officials, such power must be
5 2
unlimited except as the Constitution expressly otherwise provides.
In Humphry v. United States,53 the Supreme Court qualified the
Meyer ruling, solving the last major problem surrounding the removal
of appointive officials. In the past, the Court had sanctioned removal
by the President of appointive officials, despite the provisions of Congress that causes for discharge be specific and terms of office be definite. The Court, in the Humphry decision, ruled that the President
would prevail over the power of Congress to condition his power of
removal only where the officer to be removed occupied a purely executive position. Quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial officers, 54 though
appointed by the President, could not be removed ". . . during the
prescribed term for which the officer is appointed, except for one or
more of the causes named in the applicable statute."
Therefore, upon the refusal of an executive officer, occupying a
purely executive position, to testify as to Communist party membership
or activity, it would seem that the President cani in his discretion,
remove him from office. Nor would it be necessary for the President
to justify his action on the basis of the weight to be assigned the
inference that the officer is or was a Communist. Officials occupying
quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial positions could be removed only if
the specific refusal to testify fell within one of the specific causes for
discharge given in the applicable statute.
There have been no cases at the Federal level involving a discharge
under specific cause provisions for a refusal to testify because of the
privilege against self-incrimination. However, it would seem that the
Federal courts would follow State court decisions involving similar
situations. These will be considered later in the article.
INFERIOR OFFICERS

The Constitution provides that "Congress may vest the Appointment
of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone,
in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." 55 No definition
of the term "inferior Officers" is supplied by the Constitution. However, the term would seem to include all officers whose appointments
are not provided for by the Constitution and who are appointed by the
President, Courts of Law or Department Heads by virtue of Con52

Supra, note 48.
53Humphry v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
54 See e.g., Federal Trade Commission, 15 U.S.C.A. 41, "Any Commissioner may

be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance

in office."
55Supra, note 42.
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gressional authorization but without the advice and consent of the
Senate. 8
The Constitution has been interpreted to grant to Congress in the
case of inferior Officers the power to "limit and restrain the power of
removal as it deems best for the public interest."5 7 Under this interpretation-prior to the Meyer case-it was well established that Congress,
in delegating the appointment of inferior Officers to the President,
Courts of Law or to the Heads of Departments, could prescribe rules
governing their appointment and removal.5 8 However, the broad powers
of the President recognized in the Meyer"9 and Humphry ° decisions
would seem to. indicate that the President, as head of the Executive
department, could discharge inferior Officers occupying purely Executive positions despite Congressional attempts to provide definite terms
of office or specific causes for discharge. Though the Congressional
power over the appointment of inferior Officers by the Courts or
Department Heads remains unaffected, the exact status of the presidential power seems uncertain. 61 In any event, the removal of inferior
Officers occupying quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial positions can only
be effected if a refusal to testify because of the privilege against selfincrimination falls within one of the specific causes provided by statute.
As a practical matter, where the appointment of inferior Officers
is vested in the heads of particular departments, their discharge for
refusal to testify poses no problem. Such officers are normally removable only on proof (subject to judicial review) of one of the specific
grounds provided by statute. 62 However, Congress, on August 26, 1950,
provided the heads of several departments with authority-notwithstanding the provisions of any other law-to suspend without pay any
civilian officer or employee of his department, where, in the "absolute
discretion" of the department head, it should be deemed necessary in
the interests of national security. 3 The President was further authorized to extend these provisions to all other departments of the government. This he did on April 27, 1953.64 Inasmuch as the department
heads are dependent upon the President for their appointment and
continuation in office, there seems little doubt that they "in their sole
discretion" will follow the President's executive order5 of October 15,
58

Supra, note 47; United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508 (1879); Ex parte
Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880).
57 United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886).

58 Supra, notes 48 and 57.
59 Supra, note 48.
60 Ibid.
61
Supra, note 44.
62 Supra, note 56.
63 64 STAT. 476, 5 U.S.C.A. 22.
Exec. Order No. 10450,.18 FED. REG. 2489, 5 U.S.C.A. 631 (April 27, 1953).
64
65
Exec. Order No. 10491, 18 FED. REG. 6583, 5 U.S.C.A. 631 (Oct. 15, 1953).
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1953, and consider a refusal to testify because of the privilege against
self-incrimination as a ground justifying discharge from office or
employment.
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES

Though ordinarily the term "employee" refers to one who stands in
a contractual relationship to his employer, 66 the term as applied to
Federal government personnel signifies all subordinate officials of the
Federal government receiving their appointments from officials not
capable of being
specifically recognized by the Constitution as being
67
vested by Congress with the appointive power.
At a very early date, 1871, Congress authorized the President to
prescribe regulations to govern the admission of civilian employees into
government service. 68 In 1883, Congress authorized by statute the
appointment of a Civil Service Commission to aid the President in the
preparation of a classified Civil Service program. 69 Since then, the
President with the aid of the Commission, and in furtherance of his
responsibility "to take care that the laws 'be faithfully executed" 70 has,
by his appointments and directives to the Civil Service Commission,
determined the rules governing the qualifications, procurement and
discharge of Federal employees. Thus, various loyalty programs
covering Civil Service personnel have been initiated in the past.71
In addition to the efforts of the Executive department, Congress has
also taken an active part in the field of personnel loyalty, particularly
since the Korean situation. In 1950, increasingly concerned about the
loyalty of Federal employees, Congress authorized the heads of several
departments to dismiss without pay any Federal employee when the
department head should, in his absolute discretion, deem it "necessary
72
in the interests of national security."
As has been previously noted, the President was authorized to
extend this regulation to all departments of the government. In so
extending it, on April 27, 1953, the President outlined a rather detailed
program to guide the department heads. 73 On October 15, 1953, the
loyalty program was modified to provide that:
"Refusal by the witness upon the ground of constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination, to testify before a Con6635 Am. JuR., Master and Servant §2.

67 United States v. Germaine, supra, note 56; Auffmalt v. Hedder, 137 U.S. 310
(1890) ; Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
68 Ra,. STAT. §1753, 5 U.S.C.A. 631.
6922 STAT. 403, as amended 54 STAT. 1216, 5 U.S.C.A. 632, 3.
7oSupra, note 31.
71 See e.g., Federal Employees Loyalty Program, Exec. Order No. 9835, 17 FED.
RE. 1935, 5 U.S.C.A. 631 (March 21, 1947).
72 Supra, note 63.
73 Supra, note 64.
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gressional committee regarding charges of alleged disloyalty or
other misconduct . ..
was to be considered in determining whether the retention of the
employee was clearly consistent with the interests of national security.
If the retention of the employee was not considered to be consistent
with the interests of national security, he should be discharged.
Upon discharge, the issue of the employee's disloyalty-or whether
in fact his discharge was "in the interests of national security"-would
not be subject to judicial review. While one who is discharged pursuant
to a government loyalty program is entitled to have the removal proceedings conform in substance to the requirements of the order,7 5 the
final decision relating to grounds for removal rests with the official
making the dismissal and is not subject to judicial review.76
It could not be claimed that such dismissal violates due process. It
has been consistently held that government employment is not
"property," 77 nor in that particular is it a contract.78 There being no
property or contract in the employment the substantive terms of the due
process clause do not apply to a holder of a Federal government
position. 9
Present regulations provide that an employee dismissed under the
security program is eligible for re-employment by the same branch if
the department head is satisfied that the "re-employment is clearly consistent with the interests of national security," or by a different branch
if the individual is cleared by the Civil Service Commission. 0 Therefore, the Bill of Attainder problem presented in the Lovett case' . is
avoided.
The Lovett case held a legislative enactment providing permanent
proscription from government service as a punishment for those found
guilty of disloyalty to be an infliction of "severe" punishment "without a
judicial trial." Because the legislative enactment made no provision for
notice, hearing, or an opportunity to be represented by counsel, it was
held to be a Bill of Attainder and, as such, a violation of the Sixth
Amendment.
745 Supra, note 65.
Kutcher v. Gray, 199 F.2d 783 (1952).
76United States ex rel Taylor v. Taft, 203 U.S. 461 (1904); Caswell v. Morgan,
98 F.2d 296 (1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 596 (1938); Morgan v. Board of
Commissioners of the District of Columbia, 141 F.2d 274 (1944) ; Levine v.
Farley, 107 F.2d 186 (1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 692 (1940).
77Taylor v. Beckham,. 178 U.S. 548 (1900) and cases cited therein; Ex parte
Sawyer, 124 U.S. 700 (1888).
7sBuetler v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 10 How. (U.S.) 402 (1850);
Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99 (1890).
79Bailey
v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, aff'd, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
8
oSupra, notes 63, 64.
81

United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
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Bailey v. Richardson 2 extended the Lovett case, holding that in

proscription for three years rather than for life, the "difference is
merely one of degree and not of principle." Clearly, by avoiding proscription from government service for any set period, the present
regulations avoid the Bill of Attainder problem.
The Court's attitude toward the right to remove Federal employees
should make it apparent that Federal employees who invoke the privilege against self-incrimination to avoid testifying as to Communist
party membership or activity may be properly discharged from Federal
employment.
STATE AND MUNICIPAL PERSONNEL

Several states and municipalities, for example, Louisiana8 3 and
New York,8 4 have initiated programs dealing with government personnel who refuse to testify because of the privilege against selfincrimination. The majority of states, however, rely upon the usual
constitutional and statutory provisions to regulate and discharge such
personnel. As is true in the Federal field, certain personnel may be
discharged in the discretion of their superiors.85 The majority of state
and municipal personnel can be discharged only upon proof of such
grounds as neglect of duty, incapacity and misconduct specifically
mentioned in statutes and constitutional provisions.8 6 To discharge such
personnel, it would be necessary to equate a refusal to testify as to
Communist party membership or activity, because of the privilege
against self-incrimination, with one of the specific grounds for which
they may be discharged.
STATUTORY "FOR CAUSE" AND SPECIFIC CAUSE PROVISIONS

The usual statutory provisions placing restrictions upon the right
to discharge government personnel are of two types. The first provides
that discharge may be only for such specific causes as incapacity, neglect
of duty, malfeasance in office and gross misconduct. The second type
provides that discharge may be only "for good and sufficient cause,"
"due cause" or "conduct unbecoming an officer."
There have been no cases under the first type of statute involving a
discharge because of a refusal to testify based upon the privilege against
8

2Supra, note 79.

83

84
85

86

LA. REv. STAT.

tit.33 §2426 (1950).

New York City Charter §903 (1951); See also Philadelphia Home Rule
Charter, §10-110 (1951).
See e.g., Wis. STAT. §§17.07-10, 13.245 (1951) ; State ex rel Wagner v. Dahl,
140 Wis. 301, 122 N.W. 748 (1909) ; State ex rel Gil v. Common Council of the
City of Watertown, 9 Wis. 754 (1859); State ex rel Danfurth v. Kuehn,
34 Wis. 729 (1847); Ekern v. McGovern, 154 Wis. 157, 142 N.W. 595 (1913).
See e.g., Wis. STAT. §§16.24, 17.07-10 (1951); State ex rel Wagner v. Dahl,
140 Wis. 301, 122 N.W. 748 (1909) ; State ex rel Nelson v. Henry, 221 Wis. 127,
266 N.W. 267 (1936) ; Esser v. McBride, 215 Wis. 574, 254 N.W. 657 (1934).
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self-incrimination. Under the second type of statute the cases that have
arisen have dealt primarily with police and law enforcement officials.
Several police discharge cases have arisen under statutory "for
cause" provisions involving a refusal to testify. Typical of these are
Drury v. Hurley8 8 and Souder v. City of Philadelphia.9 Both cases
involved police officers who refused to testify before a grand jury
because of the privilege against self-incrimination. When charged
specifically with "conduct unbecoming an officer," the officers were
discharged. Approving their discharge, the courts found that the
refusal to testify was not only a breach of the officers' duty and
responsibility, but also a breach of the confidence and trust the public
had a right to impose in such officials.
Several other police discharge cases have arisen under express
statutory and constitutional provisions requiring police officers to testify
when called before grand juries. Typical of these are Cantaline v.
McClellan90 and Christalv. Police Commissionerof the City and County
of San Francisco.91 Though decided under constitutional and statutory
provisions requiring discharge for a refusal to testify before a grand
jury, the reasoning as well as the express language of the court indicates, that even in the absence of such a requirement, a refusal to testify
would be grounds for dismissal as "conduct unbecoming an officer."
As the California court pointed out:
"As we view the situation, when pertinent questions were propounded to the appellants before the grand jury, the answers to
which questions would tend to incriminate them, they were put
to a choice which they voluntarily made. Duty required them to
answer. Privilege permitted them to refuse to answer. They
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) indicated that the due process clause
in the Federal Constitution limits the right of state governments to deal with
their employees. The case involved an Oklahoma loyalty oath statute forbidding the employment of persons who belonged to certain subversive organizations. Mere membership was grounds for denial of employment. The
individuals did not need to know the nature of the particular organization.
Holding that the statute violated due process because of an "indiscriminate
classification of innocent with knowing activity" the Court ruled that "Constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion
pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary and discriminatory." However, it
cannot be said that a discharge for a refusal to testify is the same as discharging an individual because of mere membership in an organization whose
true nature is unknown to him. It must be assumed that Committee procedure
is proper. If so, a witness, knowing that he would be given an opportunity
to explain his innocent connection with the Communist party, would not refuse
to answer. It would seem that he would only refuse to testify if he were
8 unable to explain satisfactorily his activity without incriminating himself.
s Drury v. Hurley, 339 II1. App. 33, 88 N.E.2d 728 (1949).
89 Souder v. City of Philadelphia,, 305 Pa. 1, 156 A. 245 (1931).
90
Canteline v. McClellan, 282 N.Y. 166, 25 N.E.2d 972, affirming 258 App. Div.
314, 16 N.Y.S.2d 792 (1940).
9' Christal v. Police Commissioner of the City and County of San Francisco,
33 Cal. App.2d 564, 92 P.2d 416 (1939).
87

92 Ibid.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

chose to exercise the privilege, but the exercise of the privilege
was wholly inconsistent with their duty as police officers. They
clearly had a constitutional right to refuse to answer under the
circumstances, but it is certain that they had no constitutional
right to remain police officers
in face of their clear violation of
9' 3

the duty placed upon them.

However, in cases involving the dismissal of individuals other than
police and law enforcement officials, the courts have 'been reluctant to
follow this reasoning. They have refused to accept the argument that a
refusal to testify because of the privilege against self-incrimination is
either a breach of the employee's duty or that it renders him incompetent to perform the particular duties of his position. For example, an
attorney's failure to waive immunity from prosecution in testifying on
incriminating matters before a board investigating unlawful and unethical practices did not constitute conduct so prejudicial to the
administration of justice as to warrant discipline or disbarment. 4 Nor
did an attorney's failure to waive the privilege when testifying constitute grounds for denying the reinstatement to the bar.95 In a similar
manner, the failure of a judge, to sign a waiver of immunity when
testifying before a grand jury investigating a murder did not constitute
such a violation of his duty as a lawyer and officer of the court to aid
96
in the prosecution of crime to warrant disbarment.
An approach to the problem, slightly different from the traditional
one, has been taken by the New York courts.

97

It must be noted,

however, that the discharge cases considered by the New York courts
have involved municipal personnel discharged under a section of the
New York City Charter. This section provides for the automatic
dismissal of municipal personnel who refuse to testify or give an immunity waiver when called upon to testify as to subversive activity. s
The New York court seems to indicate that a refusal to testify as to
Communist party membership or activity because of the privilege
against self-incrimination would be sufficient cause for discharge even
in the absence of such a regulation. Enunciating the general principle
that "a public employee's official conduct must at all times conform to
o3 For similar decisions involving police officials who invoke the privilege against
self-incrimination, see, Scholl v. Bell, 125 Ky. 750, 102 S.W. 248 (1907),
8 WIC.GoRE, EVIDENCE §2231 (3rd ed. 1940) ; McAuliff v. City of New Bedford,
155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
94 Matter of Ellis, 282 N.Y. 435, 26 N.E.2d 967 (1940); Matter of Grace,

282 N.Y. 428, 26 N.E.2d 963 (1940).

O5 Ex parte Marshall, 165 Miss. 523, 147 So. 491 (1933).

6In re Holland, 377 Ill. App. 346, 36 N.E.2d 543 (1941).
Goldway v. Board of Education, 178 Misc. 1023, 37 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1942);
Damien v. Board of Education, 202 Misc. 915, 188 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1952),

9T

aff'd sub. nomn. Shalkman v. Board of Education, 282 App. Div. 818, 122

98

N.Y.S.2d 286 (1953)'; Koral v. Board of Education, 197 Misc. 721, 94 N.Y.S2d
378 (1950).
New York City Charter, supra, note 84.
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the obligation of loyalty to the government," the court, even though no
other evidence is presented as proof of actual disloyalty, sees in the
refusal to testify a breach of the employee's duty of loyalty to the
government. 99
The New York viewpoint is based upon the philosophy that Communism poses a very distinct and unique danger to the welfare and
security of our country. The philosophy takes recognition of the kind
of thinking which Justice Jackson sets forth in his concurring opinion
in the Dennis case where he said:
"The Communist party, nevertheless, does not seek its strength
primarily in numbers. Its aim is a relatively small party whose
strength is in selected, dedicated, indocrinated and rigidly disciplined members. From established policy it tolerates no
deviation and no debate. It seeks members that are, or may be
secreted in strategic posts in transportation, communication,
industry, government and especially, labor unions. It also seeks
to infiltrate and control organizations of professionals and other
groups. Through these placements in positions of power it seeks
a leverage over society that will make up in power of coercion
what it lacks in power of persuasion."' 00
The New York position seems quite logical. As applied to our
problem it would appear quite clear that the duty of loyalty to one's
governmrent, owed in a very particular sense by government personnel,
cannot be fulfilled by one who is a Communist. If, as it has heretofore
been said, one may logically infer that a person who refuses to testify
as to Communist party membership or activity because of the privilege
against self-incrimination is a Communist, then it may also logically be
concluded that the person is disloyal.
It is submitted that the construction of the duty of loyalty owed
by government personnel suggested 'by the New York court be applied
to all government personnel called to testify as to Communist party
membership or activity. If such personnel cannot satisfactorily explain
their activity, or if they should refuse 'because of the privilege against
self-incrimination, they'should be considered, for purposes of further
government employment, as being disloyal. Having thereby breached or
neglected their duty, they may properly be discharged.
A refusal to testify because of the privilege against self-incrimination may also render the individual incapable of properly fulfilling the
duties of his particular office or position. The inference that the witness
is a Communist, and hence disloyal, may so affect his relationship with
his fellow workers as to prevent him from effectively accomplishing
his work. Moreover, the trust and confidence that the public in
general, and his superiors in particular, have' a right to place in
99 Koral v.

Board of Education, supra, note 97.

100 Supra, note 28.
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government personnel would be destroyed. Rather than satisfying any
doubts as to his loyalty that may have occasioned his being called to
testify, 101 the witness' refusal to admit or deny Communist party
membership or activity gives rise to even more serious doubts. The
individual's qualifications for continued government employment are
thereby proportionately reduced.
Whether the individual's discharge is made under a "for cause" or
"specific cause" statute would seem to make little difference. It is
submitted that a refusal to testify as to Communist party membership
or activity because of the privilege against self-incrimination indicates
an incapacity for continued government employment and a breach of
the duty of loyalty owed in a very particular way by government
personnel.
PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT

In the absence of statute or contract, the private employer may
discharge any employee without cause.10 2 Therefore, the right of an
employer to discharge an employee for refusing to testify as to
Communist party membership or activity because of the privilege
against self-incrimination, must be examined in light of the modifications made by various state and federal statutes as well as collective
bargaining contracts.
A. State Statutes
The only type of state statute which seems to bear upon the particular problem is that prohibiting interference with employees' political
The leading case' 04 under the "political
beliefs or right to vote.'
interference" type of statute seems to give the employer wide discretionary powers when it comes to discharging an employee because of
suspected disloyalty. In Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court of
Los Angeles County,'0 5 the California court approved the discharge of
eighteen employees from the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation whose
loyalty to the United States had not been proven to the satisfaction of
the employer. At the time, the corporation was engaged in producing
vital war material. Though no precise ground for questioning the
employees' loyalty was advanced, the court implied that the eighteen
101 Hearings Before the House Un-American Activities Committee on Communist
Methods of Infiltration, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 141 (1952). This indicates that
witnesses are called only when the investigation files of some governmental
0 2 agency or the testimony of some other witness has given cause for suspicion.
1 Odell v. Humble Oil Co., 201 F.2d 123 (1953); Harmon v. United Mine
Workers of America, 166 Ark. 255, 266 S.W. 84 (1924).
303 Adopted by Calif., Colo., Conn., Fla., Kan., Ky., Md., Mass., Miss., Mo.,
Mont., Neb., N.Y., Ohio, Okla., Pa., S.C., N.D., S.D., Tex., Utah, Vt., Wis.,
Wyo.
104 Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles County, 28 Cal.2d
487, 171 P.2d 21 (1946).
105 Ibid.
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were suspected of belonging to a group advocating the overthrow of
the government by force and violence-presumably the Communist
party. Deciding that such political activity was not the type of political
activity intended to be protected under the statute, the court approved
the discharge.
Were the attitude taken by the California court in the Lockheed
case universally applied to similar statutes, employers would encounter
little difficulty in discharging employees believed to be disloyal All
that would seem to be required would be a reasonable 'belief on the part
of the employer that the employee's refusal to testify as to Communist
party membership or activity raised serious doubts as to his loyalty.
B. Federal Statutes
The National Labor Relations Act, 10 as amended by the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947,107 furnishes the principal Federal
restraint upon the employer's right to discharge. While containing no
reference to discharge because of subversive activities or a refusal to
testify based on the privilege against self-incrimination, the act empowers the National Labor Relations Board to investigate charges of
discrimination because of union activity arising out of labor-management disputes. Prior to 1950, the N.L.R.B. usually exhibited considerable suspicion and doubt as to the real reason for discharge where the
discharge of union members was predicated upon suspected disloyalty.'0 8 However, since the Korean situation the board has adopted
a somewhat more receptive attitude toward discharges based upon
suspected disloyalty 0 9
This change in attitude was exhibited -by two 1949 decisions." 0 In
both cases, evidence that the employer, acting in good faith, based his
decision solely upon the belief that the employees discharged were
Communists, was held to be sufficient grounds for discharge so as to
allow the General Counsel to refuse to issue complaints alleging discriminatory suspension of employees. One decision is particularly note10649 STAT. 497 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. 181 (1946).
10761 STAT. 136, 29 U.S.C.A. 141 (1953), popularly known as the Taft-Hartley

Act.
308Posey, Maynes & Breish Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 482 (1936); Connecticut Milling
Machine Co., 9 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 3 N.L.R.B. (Ref. Man. 289) (1938), petition
to review dismissed, 102 F.2d 979 (1932); The N.Y. Times Co., 26 N.L.R.B.
1094 (1940) ; Clayton & Lambert Mfg. Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 502 (1941) ; Franque
A. Dickins, 64 N.L.R.B. 797 (1945).
108Ad. Ruling of N.L.R.B. Gen. Counsel, Case No. 63 (March 7, 1951),
27 LAB. REL. REP:.(Ref. Man. 1443) (1951); Ad. Ruling of N.L.R.B. Gen.
Counsel, Case No. 72 (March 30, 1951), 27 LAB. REL. REP. (Ref. Man. 1510)
(1951).
:10Ibid. (Grounds in Case No. 63 were that they were named as Communists in
a libel suit and had in the past associated with Communist front organizations.
Grounds in Case No. 72 were that the employee had signed a Communist
Stockholm Peace Pledge and had added the union name to the signature.)
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worthy in that while it affirms the discharge of the employee because
he was reasonably suspected of being a Communist, the General Counsel
carefully points out that:
"....

the underlying reason for the discharge was the individual's

suspected Communist activity, which was resented by the employees and the union, and was a subject of great concern to the
employer, if only for the reason that it caused considerable unrest
among the employees.""'
The General Counsel's remarks seem to indicate that if the activity
involved were to cause considerable unrest among the employees, it
may be termed sufficient "cause" to warrant discharging the employee
concerned.
A similar attitude has been taken by the board where the employer's
action in discharging employees has been based upon Federal security
regulations. For example, the board refused to require reinstatement of
an employee discharged because of governmental refusal to consent to
his employment on any work dealing with government contracts." 2
While the grounds for the government's disapproval of the particular
employee were not advanced, the fact that the government has advanced
a policy of discharging its own employees for refusing to testify to
Communist party membership because of the privilege against selfincrimination, seems a good indication that it would refuse to approve
for work under government contracts individuals who invoke the Fifth
Amendment in refusing to testify.
The action of an employer in discharging two employees was likewise upheld where the employees refused to list upon a Federal security
questionnaire the names of unions to which they belonged. Though the
particular security regulation concerned did not require the employee
to be discharged, and though the regulation requiring the listing of the
worker's unions was later changed, the action of the employer in discharging and failing to reinstate the employee was approved. In refusing to grant the complaint alleging the discriminatory discharging of
employees, the 'board approved the employer's contention that he did not
wish, nor was he bound, to employ workers who had refused to
cooperate with the government."

3

A witness' refusal to testify as to Communist party membership
because of the privilege against self-incrimination could very likely
produce the same results as justified the discharge of the aforementioned employees. It could produce a good faith belief by the employer
that the employee is a Communist, plant unrest due to an unwillingness
11 Case No. 72, supra, note 110.

Reeves Ely Laboratories, Inc., 76 N.L.R.B. 728 (1948).
113Ad. Ruling of N.L.R.B. Gen. Counsel, Case No. 537 (July 11, 1952),
30 LAB. REL. RaP. (Ref. Man. 1303) (1952).
112
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to work with a "Red," an employer's unwillingness to employ one who
"refuses to cooperate with the government," and loss of public faith
and confidence. Therefore it -would seem that an employer could
properly discharge an employee for so refusing to testify without
violating any provisions of the National Labor Relations Act.
C. Collective Bargaining Contracts
The usual collective bargaining contract, in that it seeks to limit
the grounds upon which an employee may be discharged, presents
perhaps the most important restriction upon the employer's right to
discharge employees. The courts and the arbitrators seem to have
followed the pattern established by the N.L.R.B. when, prior to the
Korean situation, they looked with suspicion upon discharges based
upon suspected disloyalty or subversive activity; n14 but in the postKorean period they show a more lenient attitude toward such discharges based upon suspected disloyalty and subversive activity. 1 5
The arbitrators and the courts have uniformly held, despite the
presence of a collective bargaining contract, that a refusal by the
government to clear an employee for work upon government contracts
will supercede the "due cause" provisions of the contract and allow the
employee to be discharged." 6 This is true even where the security
regulation, under which the employee is denied work upon government
17
contracts, does not require him to be discharged.
Of the pre-Korean decisions, the most sweeping was, perhaps, that
involving Foot Bros. Gear and Machinery Corp. It was held that, since
it is not a crime to belong to an organization listed by the Attorney
General as subversive, an employee could not be discharged for
membership in, or for being in sympathy with, the Communist party.
In the absence of proof that there were acts of sabotage or that a
special security problem arose from his continued employment, the fact
that the man is within the law and has a right to earn a living requires
that he be allowed to maintain his employment.""
In another 1949 decision-much akin to our present problem-the
".2

'Gear and Machine Corp., 13 LAB. ARB. REP. 848 (1949); Consolidated Western Steel Corp., 13 LAB. ARB. RaE. 721 (1949); Curtis Wright
Corp., 9 LAB. An3. REP. 77 (1947); Spokane-Idaho Mining Co., 9 LAB. ARB.
Foot Bros.

REP. 749 (1947); cf Jackson Industries, Inc., 9 LAB. Ann. REP. 753 (1948).
"1 Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. of Cal., 4 Am. LAB. AR. AwARD 168,778

(1951); Pub. Ass'n of N.Y. City, 19 LAB. ARB. REP. 40 (1952) ; Publishers
Print Co.; Los Angeles Daily News, 19 LAB. ARB. REP. 39 (1952) ; cf Cutter
Laboratories, 15 LAB. ARB. REP. 431 (1950), aff'd sub. nom. Cutter Laboratories
v. Bio. Lab. Union, 16 LAB. ARB. REP. 208 (1951).
226 Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. of Cal.. supra, note 116; Bell Aircraft Corp.,
16 LAB. ARB. REP. 234 (1951) ; Curtis Wright Corp., supra, note 115; Sperry
Gyroscope Co. v. Engineers Ass'n, 279 App. Div. 630, 170 N.Y.S.2d 800,
aff'd, 304 N.Y. 582, 107 N.E.2d 78 (1951).
"17
118

Ibid.

Foot Bros. Gear and Machinery Corp., supra, note 115.
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arbitrator held that an employee could not be discharged merely for
his refusal to testify before a grand jury investigating subversive
activity, even though his employer, as a result of his refusal to testify,
incurred considerable doubt as to the employee's loyalty. The decision
as to the employee's loyalty was felt to be so difficult that the company
was held not to be qualified to determine whether or not he was loyal."19
Since 1950, the discharge of suspected subversives under general
contract provisions has been more generally upheld. The most farreaching of the post-Korean decisions is that involving the Los Angeles
Daily News. Two members of the paper's editorial staff were named
by witnesses testifying before the House Un-American Activities committee, as being one-time members of the Communist party. The employees refused to affirm or deny the 'charge; as a result, one was
discharged, while the other who was on a rehire list but not working
at the time, was not called back to work. Though admitting that
neither employee was proved to be a Communist, and that neither had
slanted his "copy," the arbizration board upheld the company's decision
ruling that the newspaper has a "quasi-public responsibility" and that
the "company has a right to expect its employees who are so accused to
answer these charges." Because of their refusal to refute these charges
the board felt that the paper would be subject to the censure of public
opinion and would, as a result, lose a considerable sum of money if it
did not move to instill faith and confidence in its publication by dis2
charging the two writers.' 0
The decisions have -been too few to establish a hard and fast rule as
to when an employee may be discharged because of questionable loyalty.
However, the tendency seems to be that in any case in which the
employer suffers actual financial injury, perhaps even potential injury,
through retaining a person of questionable loyalty, "good cause" for
discharge exists. Though the post-Korean cases advancing this position
have dealt largely with newspaper publishers and their employees who
are immediately and very definitely affected by any change in 'public
opinion or feeling, it would seem that the "injury" rule should be
applicable to all industries and employers.
It seems clear th-t injury to an employer might possibly result
from retaining an employee who has refused to testify as to Communist
party membership because of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Unrest in the plant due to suspicion and "patriotic sentiments" on the
part of fellow employees, loss of public confidence, loss of consumer
patronage, and similar results would be very clear possibilities. Such a
119 Consolidated Western Steel Corp., supra, note 115.
120 Los Angeles Daily News, supra, note 116.
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refusal to testify would constitute "due cause" warranting discharge
under the usual collective bargaining contract.
CONCLUSION
It would seem that valid reasons exist for upholding the validity of
the discharge of those who hide behind the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination when asked questions concerning
Communist party membership or activity.
One caution seems in order. It is recognized that some witnesses
may honestly fear to answer investigating committee questions because
they feel that the committee procedure may be such as not to permit
them to fully explain their present position and, as a result, incriminate
them.
If the witness took such a position, it is recognized that much of
what has been presented in this article might not have logical application. To properly deal with such an issue would require an analysis of
Committee procedures and the making of suggestions for uniform
reforms which would make unwarranted any fear on the part of the
witness. Such analysis and suggestions are beyond the scope of this
article. The propositions here presented should be read in light of an
assumption that Committee procedures are wholly fair and proper.
GERALD A. FLANAGAN
Marquette LL.B., 1954

